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School Residence Hall. After dinner, he talked informally
with the students, touching on such diverse questions as
legal education and the makeup of the Supreme Court.
On Tuesday rriorningJustice Burton taught Professor Kur
land's class in Constitutional Law. Tuesday noon he
lunched at the Quadrangle Club with the Board of Editors
and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review. Tuesday
afternoon the Justice had tea with students responsible for
the administration of the Hinton Competition, The Law
School's student-run moot-court program.
Justice Burton was, on Tuesday night, the guest of honor
at a dinner at the Quadrangle Club, which was attended by
members of the Bench, the Faculty, and the student body.
Following the dinner, the Justice delivered a public lecture
in Breasted Hall. His topic was: "The Independence and
Continuity of the Supreme Court of the United States."

At the dinner preceding his public

Kenneth Dam
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lecture,

Mr. Justice Burton talks with

Law Review and Bigelow

Teaching

Fellow

Thomas Watts

On Monday and Tuesday, February 4 and 5, The Honor
able Harold H. Burton, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, was a guest of The Law School.
On the morning of February 4 the Justice taught Professor
Allen's class in Criminal Law. At noon of that day the
School was host at a luncheon downtown, which was held
to

give members of the Chicago Bar an opportunity to
the Justice. Following the luncheon, Justice Burton

meet

on the contributions of several of the
Chief
great
Justices to the solution of the administrative and
mechanical problems involved in the proper functioning of
the Supreme Court.
The Justice met that afternoon with the Bigelow Teach

spoke informally

ing Fellows and the Commonwealth Fellows. That evening
he had dinner with law students in Mead House, The Law

The Honorable Harold H. Burton, Associate Justice of the Supreme
before his public lecture during his

Court or the United States, just
recent visit to The Law School.
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dinner in The Law School Residence Hall, with
(left), and Dean Bennett, president

Resident Head

(right).

II
At the

colloquium held in Santiago in September, I956,
apparent that there exists a general agreement as to
the desirability of the greatest possible stability of marriages
and family relations in general. This conviction was
it

compulsion. If two married people do not wish to live
together, or if one is determined to abandon the other, no
government can forcibly keep them together. All legal
devices available are therefore of an indirect character only.

was

shared

equally by the representatives of the Western coun
people's democracies, and of the oriental coun
tries. There also exists
widespread feeling that at the
the
time
of
present
stability the institution of marriage is
being endangered by number of recent trends and de
velopments. Everybody agreed that all possible measures

Indirect is even the effect of the rules oflaw which either
render the tie of marriage completely indissoluble or permit
the dissolution of the marriage tie only under certain

tries, of the

a

limited conditions. A legal system which excludes divorce
or under which a divorce is obtainable
only with difficulty
cannot prevent the occurrence of factual separation and
abandonment or the creation of new adulterous unions.
All it can do is to prevent the creation of a legally recog
nized new union. The effectiveness of the law concerning
divorce is therefore not so obvious as it may appear at a
first glance.

a

should be taken to preserve and, in so far as necessary, to
strengthen the stability of the institutions of marriage and
the family. It also became apparent £rom the discussion
that there exists a need for knowledge and information
with respect to both the actually existing state of facts and
the possible cause-effect relationships between the various
devices advocated and the actual state and trend of marriage

stability.
The present dearth of factual knowledge and informa
was felt to be serious and to be
potentially productive

tion

of dangerous effects; widely divergent opinions have been
professed with great strength and conviction. On
the one side, for instance, it is said that "divorce breeds
divorce," while on the other side it is held with equal con
viction that "the lack of divorce breeds
immorality." The
advocates of neither opinion have so far been able to adduce
proof for their respective positions.
The devices which are potentially apt to influence the
stability of marriage are many and of great variety.
held and

Many

useful devices do not belong to the sphere of
law but rather to those of religion, education,
psychiatry,

potentially

and similar non-legal spheres.
The characteristic of the sphere of law is compulsion
through the might of the government. No government
however can bring about durability of a marriage by direct

city planning,

.

ascertain is the casual effectiveness
of
laws concerning such topics as
marriage stability
marital property rights, social security, taxation, pensions,
family allowances or housmg, or of laws providing for the
use of
public funds for marriage counseling or education for
Even

more

difficult

to

on

family living.
In view of this striking lack of indispensable
knowledge
and information, the members of the colloquium unani
mously reached the conclusion that the I957 Colloquium
should be charged with the task of preparing the collection
of such factual knowledge.
It was also unanimously held that it would be im
possible for a colloquium of short duration by itself to fmd
all the information which is presently lacking. The task of
collecting the data will require years. The colloque will
have achieved a task of great importance, however, if it
succeeds in finding and defining the questions to be an
swered, in indicating methods for their solution, and in
establishing a well-structured systematic survey of all the

problems.
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only to eliminate all friction, but also to carryon all
conversation in the calm spirit of scientific
inquiry. It was
also possible to reach agreement on a considerable number
not

of propositions, the
marized as follows:

most

important

of which

can

be

sum

I.
Legal devices to prevent family breakup can operate
only by indirection. Governmental power cannot be effec
tively used to compel a married man or woman to live

with his or her spouse against his or her own wishes. No
such attempts are made anywhere in modern society. All
the state can do is, by threatening punishment or by direct
action, provide for the enforcement of those duties of
support which are incumbent upon a husband or father or,
in some countries, upon a married woman or a mother.
The law can also prevent the factual breakup of a mar
riage being followed by the conclusion of new legitimate

marriages by
Hon. Edwin

Robson,

John McCormick, JD '16, and Hon.
Illinois Appellate Court, at a reception for

Hon.

Joseph Burke, judges of the
Mr. Justice Burton.

the

go a step further and
the
a formalized interna
establishment
of
try
promote
tional organization through which the answers to the vari
ous
questions maybe sought. It will be one of the tasks ofthe
colloque to investigate whether or not the establishment of
such an organization appears to be practicable and, if so,
what funds will be needed, how they might be obtained,
and along what lines the organization should be estab

Perhaps

colloquium may even

to

lished.
If the

colloquium is to achieve its aim, it must be partici
in
pated not only by legal scholars but also by experts in
empirical sociology and perhaps also by representatives of
such other fields as social welfare, psychology, or education.
The legal experts are to be chosen so that they represent the
principal legal systems. The participants from the field of
social science should be scholars of special experience in
family research.
III
A. When the

assembled in Santiago de
Compestela, it had before it the rich material of the reports
that had been prepared for it. This material made it clear
that efforts to protect and promote marriage stability have
to a considerable extent been determined
by tenets of re
ligious faith or basic philosophy, which are held with deep
conviction, but which it would be pointless to make the
subject matter of discussion. The colloquium thus decided
to accept as a
working premise the proposition that stabil
ity of marriage is desirable and to limit its discussion to the
problem of finding out by what legal devices, if any, this
end might be achieved. In this way it was possible in
discussions which were participated in by representatives
of Catholic Spain, Communist Yugoslavia, Protestant or
secularist Scandinavia, modern Japan, and other nations,

colloquium

Divorce

the

parties.

laws, that is, laws which exclude

or limit the
of
the
tie
of
an
possibility dissolving
legal
existing marriage,
cannot prevent the factual
breakup of a marriage by uni
lateral abandonment or mutual separation or by the crea
tion of new irregular unions.

While it is

that

a
society's state of marriage
influenced
stability
by the comparative
ease or
with
which
the
formal
dissolution of a
difficulty
the
conclusion
of a new
marriage and, consequently,
can
be
few
efforts
have
so far
obtained,
legitimate marriage
been made to obtain more precise information about this
causal relationship, and hardly any reliable information is
presently available.

2.

is

3.

of

an

likely

to some extent

Among the present laws dealing with the dissolution
existing marriage, the following groups can be dis

tinguished:
a) Marriage is completely indissoluble in any way other
than by the death of one of the spouses-Canon Law of the
Roman Catholic church; Spain, Italy, Peru, Brazil, Co
lombia.

marriage can be dissolved upon the petition of one
if
the
other has been guilty of a grave violation of his
party
marital duties-system of divorce sanction; Verschuldens

b)

A

prinzip; England, Scotland,

most

states

of the United

States of America, France, and many others.
Kinds of misconduct enumerated in the divorce

statutes

"grounds for divorce" are such acts as adultery (only
ground for divorce in New York), physical cruelty (Eng
land, most American states), mental cruelty of various
kinds (France, some American states), or malicious deser
tion for a certain minimum period, such as two
years
(Germany) or one year (Illinois).
c) A marriage can be dissolved where it is so thoroughly
broken in fact that its factual revival cannot be reasonably
expected-system of divorce faillite, Zerriittungsprinzip,
The agency by which a party's application for the dis
as

solution of his

by

the

marriage is to be acted upon may be ordered
appropriate statute to grant the application if the
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actual

that "the power going with 'control' is an asset which be
longs only to the corporation; and that payment for that

impunity when the buyer is an interested customer,
potential, for the corporation's product. But when the
sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate
good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has
or

power, if it goes

caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time
of market shortage, where a call on a corporation's product

tion of control

premium.

This passage suggests that the case was treated as analogous
the looting cases. The court could say that sale of control

to

management would

new

not

corporation

and would thus violate its

loyalty.

No reference

made

was

to

the

fiduciary duty of
looting decisions,

however, and this may possibly reflect a desire to make the
opinion serviceable as an entering wedge for a broader rule
of liability.

The

ing

foregoing is a summary of the principal cases impos
restrictions upon sales of controlling shares. In none of

these

cases

does the

same

offer

must

argue for

a broad rule that the
all shareholders, and many of
the opinions expressly reject this rule. Furthermore, there
are a number of decisions
(in addition to the Dunnett
cases) in which the court refused to make the seller account
for a premium. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 38 N.Y.S.
zd 517 (rsr Dept., I942). Tryon v. Smith, I9I Ore. I72

opinion

be made

go into the corporate

as

a

asset

Presumably
is

a

urged for a broad restriction on sales of
from
concern over the motives of the
pur
springs
chaser and the type of transactions likely to follow the
transfer of control. Professor Jennings suggests that in the
usual case the purchaser's willingness to pay a premium
springs from an expectation of returns which will not be
shared with all shareholders, returns flowing from private
exploitation of "corporate patronage or other non-balance
sheet assets or from diversion of profits in reorganization or
liquidation." The concern is that the purchaser and those
he places on the board will not exercise their management
powers in the interests of all the shareholders and that the
usual rules of fiduciary loyalty are insufficient protection
against such mismanagement.
This suggestion recalls the Newport Steel Corporation
case, in which the sale was to a group interested primarily in
The first

allocate

in accordance with the best interests of the

must

should this be true?

reason

control

a

production

anywhere,

Property. They suggested

way?

potential customer under conditions of shortage re
sulted necessarily in sacrifice of corporate good will only
to a

if it assumed that the

and Private

the no
of
corporate
way
saying
that the law should make it impossible for holders of
controlling shares to realize the fUll market value of their
shares-or what would be the market value in the absence
of the rule suggested. Why should the law intervene in this

treasury." Why

commands an unusually large premium, in one form or another,
we think it sound law that a
fiduciary may not appropriate to

himself the value of this

Corporation

to

(I95I).
The view that

premium value

controlling

shares may have a legitimate
by the decision of the

is also illustrated

House of Lords in Short

v.

Treasury Commrs., [19481

534· Here the government

A. C.

had taken all the shares of

a

corporation under Defense Regulations requiring the pay
ment

buyer

of "not less than the value
as between a
willing
and a willing seller." Holders of relatively small
...

.

blocks of shares objected to the price offered (295. 3d.),
which was based upon stock-market quotations. They con
tended that the price should have been determined by
valuing the entire enterprise and dividing by the number
of shares. The arbitrator found that on such a basis each
share would have been worth 4IS. 9d. This contention,
however, was rejected. Lord Uthwatt said:
If

some one

carry control

shareholder held

a

number of shares sufficient

to

of the company, it

might well be that the value
holding under the regulation was

to be attributed to his
greater than the sum of the values that would be attributed to the
shares comprised in that holding if they were split between

proper

various persons. The reason is that he has
something to sell
control-which the others considered separately have not. The
contention of the appellant, if accepted, would, as the Court of
Appeal point out, deny him the real value of his holding.

In this paper, however, my concern is not with the
present state of the law but with the desirability of a rule
which would destroy the premium value of controlling

shares. Such

a

rule

was

urged by

Berle and Means in The

Barnabas Sears, vice-president of the Illinois State Bar Association,
and Stanton Hyer, JD '25, of Rockford, Illinois, at the dinner for

Justice

Burton.
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of a controlling block of corporate shares
an
when
holding
opportunity to sell at the same price
is not given to the other shareholders? If he does so, must
he account to the corporation or to the other shareholders
for the part of the proceeds which represent the "control

May

the

owner

sell his

premium"?

These

questions

are

ably

discussed in

recent

law-review articles by Professor Richard W. Jennings (44
Calif 1. Rev. I) and Professor Noyes Leech (104 U. of
Pa. 1. Rev. 725). These articles marshal evidence of a
trend restricting the freedom of controlling shareholders to
sell their shares. Professor Jennings supports the flat rule that
when control is sold all shareholders should have an op
portunity to sell on the same terms. In this paper I wish to

grounds for such a rule and to indicate why I
believe them unsatisfactory.
To clear the way for a consideration of the central ques
tion, it is necessary first to refer to three theories upon
which relief may be given against the seller in certain special
examine the

situations.

ofoffice.-Corporate officers or directors may not re
paid to induce them to resign or to aid others in
becoming their successors. This rule was developed in cases
Sale

tain

sums

no sale of shares was involved, but it has been in
voked also where an agreement for sale of controlling
shares required the seller to facilitate the buyer's gaining

where

control of the board

by causing successive resignations of
of nominees of the buyer. It is
substitution
directors and
that
this constitutes a sale of directorships as well as
argued
the
shares, and
argument has added force if an identifiable
of
the
consideration seems to have been paid for thus
part
procuring the election of new directors.
Such a case was Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427 (1914), in
which a uniform price per share was offered to majority
and minority holders alike, but with a separate "control
fund" paid to the defendants (and not distributed among
them according to stock ownership). The court required
the defendant to account for the "control fUnd," and the
opinion shows the danger of a separate allocation of con
sideration for control. It is reasonable to infer, however,
that the consideration was separated in this manner because

the seller

to account for a
portion of the price on the
that
offices
have
been sold.
theory
corporate
sale
some
of the cases requiring
Inducing
by minority.-In

quire
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accounting for the premium, the sellers were directly im
plicated in representations or suggestions made to the
minority that the price offered to them was the same as
that which the majority were receiving. This was the situa
tion in Dunnettv. Am, 71 F. zd 912 (C.A. loth, 1934). Here

given to shareholders who relied upon a com
interpretation that all share
holders were treated equally. The court also spoke of the
sale of the controlling shares as a "corporate transaction"
recovery

was

munication which invited the

analogous

sale of assets, in which shareholders would
equally. The actual ground of the decision is

to a

participate

in the fact that the court denied
shareholders
who made no showing of re
recovery
liance upon the misleading communication. In a related
case it was later
pressed upon the court that its "corporate
transaction" theory would justify recovery on behalf of all
shareholders. The court rejected this argument, however,
and again refused relief to shareholders who were not mis
led. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F. zd 68 (C.A. loth, 1937).

clearly shown, however,
to

Negligent sale to irresponsible buyer.-In another group of
liability has been imposed where controlling shares

cases

sold to persons who later looted the corporation and
where the sale was made under circumstances putting the
were

seller

notice of the

probability of such injury. The lead
involved
investment
ing
companies which are subject
to
of
because
the liquidity of their assets.
peculiar danger
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
on

cases

(E.D.
olds)

Pa.,

1940),42

28 N.Y.S. zd

In these

liability

Supp.

126

(1941).

622,30 N.Y.S. zd 755

Gerdes

(Sup.

v.

Reyn

1941).
buyer's ap
Ct.,

offered and the
control of the assets were circum
to
put the sellers on notice. In this situation
is justified on general tort principles. The freedom
cases

parent haste
stances held

the

F.

high prices

to secure

Continued

on

page
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the buyer was planning to represent to minority share
holders that the majority had accepted the same price for
their shares. Such

misleading statements were actually
might well have been given on the
ground that the minority were improperly induced to part
with their shares. This ground is discussed below.
However, in cases where no special abuse was involved,
the convenient arrangement for transfer of control by
resignation and filling of vacancies has not been held to remade, and the

recovery

other members of the Bench. Left to right:
and
Judge Ryan Duffy
Judge H. Nathan Swaim, JD '16, of the
U.S. Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit); Judge Elmer J. Schnack

Mr.

Justice

Burton

greeting

F.

enberg, JD '12, of the same court; Judge Julius Hoffman, of the U.S.
District Court; and Judge Hugo Friend, JD '08,
of the Illinois Appel
late Court.

